Generalizations about categories are central to human understanding, and generic language (e.g. "Dogs bark.") provides a simple and ubiquitous way to communicate these generalizations. Yet the meaning of generic language is philosophically puzzling and has resisted precise formalization. In this talk, MH Tessler will share with you an exploration of the idea that the core meaning of a generic sentence is simple but underspecified, and that general principles of pragmatic reasoning are responsible for establishing the precise meaning in context. Building on recent probabilistic models of language understanding, MH Tessler will present a formal model for the evaluation and comprehension of generic sentences. This model explains the puzzling flexibility in usage of generics in terms of diverse prior beliefs about properties. These prior beliefs, in turn, are shown to be structured, perhaps reflecting deeper conceptual knowledge about objects and properties. The model simultaneously handles the flexible "truth conditions" of generics, and the paradoxically strong implications of generics which are believed to be so foundational to concept